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Introduction
The bond market is a key funding tool for many 
Australian financial institutions and corporates. A 
wide range of issuers and investors participate in 
the market. The Australian non-government bond 
market can be divided into four main categories:
  • bonds issued by Australian financial institutions;
  • bonds issued by Australian corporates 
(non-financials);
  • long-dated asset-backed securities (ABS) issued 
by Australian-domiciled vehicles; and
  • Australian dollar bonds issued in Australia by 
non-residents, known as Kangaroo bonds.
Over the decade to 2007, the stock of 
non-government bonds outstanding increased 
from $110 billion to over $750 billion, to be over 
six times larger than the government bond market. 
The non-government bond market has continued 
to expand over recent years, but the growth rate 
slowed during the financial crisis as investor risk 
aversion increased and the demand for debt 
financing declined. 
There was a clear turning point for the bond market 
in mid 2007 when the early stages of financial 
turmoil emerged in money markets. Because of 
this, mid 2007 is used in this article as the starting 
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the Australian bond market functioned well during the financial crisis. Changes in investor 
sentiment and issuer behaviour led to a slowing in issuance and an increase in the average credit 
quality of new issuance. While the average bond term shortened and spreads widened, these 
trends have since reversed somewhat as market conditions have improved. 
point for the financial crisis so far as it pertains to the 
bond market. Unlike the global experience, there 
were few rating downgrades and negligible bond 
defaults in the Australian market during the financial 
crisis. Credit quality of the market remained high. 
There were, however, substantial changes in the 
sectoral composition of the market. The reduction 
in investor appetite for credit risk during the crisis 
saw bond terms at issuance shorten, bond spreads 
widen to historical highs and an increase in the 
average credit quality of new issues, particularly after 
the introduction of the Government’s Guarantee 
Scheme for Large Deposits and Wholesale Funding.   
Bond terms have subsequently lengthened as 
market conditions settled. While spreads also 
narrowed significantly, they are not expected to 
return to the levels seen prior to the financial crisis 
in the near future.
Issuance Patterns
Over the decade prior to the onset of the financial 
crisis, the Australian bond market grew significantly. 
Unsecured bond issuance by financial institutions 
was strong, particularly offshore, and an increasing 
range of corporates accessed capital market funding. 
Kangaroo bond issuance also increased, contributing 
to the depth and diversity of the domestic market.1  
1  For a discussion of the factors that have contributed to the strong 
growth in Kangaroo bonds see Ryan (2007). *  The authors are from Domestic Markets Department.56 ReseRve BAnk of AustRAliA
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The onset of the financial crisis in the bond market in 
mid 2007 led to a reversal of some of these issuance 
patterns (Graph 1). As has been well documented 
elsewhere, the collapse of the US sub-prime 
mortgage market led to a general reappraisal of the 
risks involved with all structured credit markets and 
a widespread increase in risk aversion.2 While these 
events had an impact on the entire Australian bond 
market, the securitisation market was most affected. 
Although the Australian securitisation market was 
not subject to the shortcomings of the US market, 
investor appetite dried up.3
In addition to the reduction in investor demand, 
sales of existing RMBS by distressed leveraged 
foreign investors contributed to the dislocation 
in the securitisation market; these investors were 
mainly structured investment vehicles (SIVs) which 
owned around one-third of Australian RMBS prior 
to the financial crisis. This overhang of supply 
saw RMBS spreads increase significantly to the 
point where issuance was not economic for most 
lenders and access to the market was limited. Since 
mid 2007, quarterly issuance of RMBS has averaged 
$3 billion compared with average quarterly issuance 
of $15  billion in the two years pre-crisis. And, in 
contrast to the years preceding the financial crisis 
– during which RMBS issuance was evenly split 
onshore and offshore – issuance has been entirely 
into the domestic market, with the Australian Office 
of Financial Management (AOFM) being a major 
investor in some issues. (Around one-quarter of the 
RMBS issued since the start of the crisis has been 
purchased by the AOFM.) 
The global rise in risk and risk aversion also saw 
the cost of lower-rated corporate bond issuance 
increase sharply and, for a period, some corporates 
had difficulty accessing the bond market. One 
result of this was that many corporates turned to 
the banks for funding. The stock of corporate bonds 
outstanding fell for a short time, but as bond spreads 
2  For example, RBA (2007a, 2007b).
3  See Debelle (2008) for a comparison of the Australian and US 
securitisation markets.
Growth in ABS, most of which was residential 
mortgage-backed securities (RMBS), was particularly 
strong. The rapid growth in securitisation reflected a 
number of factors including: 
  • strong demand for housing finance;
  • increased competition from mortgage originators, 
which typically relied on securitisation for funding;
  • the desire by banks to diversify their funding; and 
  • investor demand for high-yielding AAA-rated 
securities, making this a cost-effective way of 
raising funds for many borrowers. 
By mid 2007, ABS had grown to be close to 30 per cent 
of the stock of bonds outstanding, financials were 
40  per  cent, corporates were 18  per  cent and   
Kangaroos 13 per cent. 
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narrowed over 2009, corporates began to tap the 
bond market again, substituting this for borrowings 
from banks. Corporates also sought to reduce their 
leverage by raising equity to pay down bank debt.4 
While bond issuance was initially limited to larger 
corporates with an established presence in offshore 
capital markets, the range of borrowers broadened 
as investor demand for credit started to pick up in 
2009, with a number of medium-sized entities also 
issuing bonds.
The dislocation of the securitisation market 
and, in the initial stage of the financial crisis, the 
reintermediation of the corporate sector, saw banks’ 
balance sheets grow as they gained market share.   
In contrast, mortgage originators, who relied on 
RMBS for funding, sharply scaled back their lending 
to households – the share of housing loans funded 
by securitisation fell from almost 25  per  cent in   
mid 2007 to around 10 per cent in early 2010. While 
the banks also ceased using securitisation as a form 
of funding, they retained good access to the bond 
market and issued large volumes, supported by 
their strong balance sheets and, at the peak of the 
financial crisis, the introduction of the Government’s 
Guarantee Scheme.5 The share of banks’ funding 
sourced from the bond market rose by a few 
percentage points to almost one-quarter of funds as 
they sought to use more stable sources of funding. 
Kangaroo bond issuance was relatively subdued 
during much of the crisis period with quarterly 
issuance averaging less than $2  billion until 
early  2009 compared with $7½  billion in earlier 
years. There were no issues between August 2008 
and April  2009. Issuance returned in the second 
half of 2009, followed by near-record issuance 
in the March  quarter of 2010, underpinned by 
strong investor demand and a very favourable 
cross-currency basis swap spread (which is received 
by Kangaroo issuers as they swap out of Australian 
dollars and into another currency).
4  For more information see Black, Kirkwood and Shah Idil (2009).
5  For more information on the Guarantee Scheme see Schwartz (2010).
In total, bond issuance slowed during the crisis. 
The average annual growth rate in the stock of 
Australian bonds outstanding slowed to 7 per cent 
from the rapid pace of over 20 per cent over the 
previous decade, though trends differed significantly 
across sectors. Notably, the limited RMBS issuance, 
along with the ongoing amortisation of principal   
(i.e. mortgage repayments), led to the stock of   
RMBS outstanding halving between mid 2007 
and May 2010 (Graph 2). In contrast, the stock of 
financials’ bonds outstanding increased sharply, 
with the average annual growth rate picking up to 
21 per cent from 18 per cent. The stock of corporate 
bonds outstanding has grown modestly over 
this period, while the stock of Kangaroo bonds 
outstanding also increased a little.
Reflecting these developments, the composition of 
the bond market has changed significantly (Table 1). 
The share of bonds outstanding comprised of ABS 
has fallen 16 percentage points to 13 per cent, offset 
by an increase in financials’ share (up 17 percentage 
points to 57  per  cent). Shares of corporate and 
Kangaroo bonds have both remained broadly 
unchanged, at 17 and 13 per cent, respectively.
Graph 2














* As at May 2010








2009 2008 2007 2006 2005
July 200758 ReseRve BAnk of AustRAliA
the impACt of the finAnCiAl CRisis on the Bond mARket
Spreads
In the lead-up to the financial crisis, Australian bond 
spreads narrowed, consistent with global trends. 
This reversed sharply during the financial crisis as 
risk aversion increased, with spreads widening to 
historical highs.
As noted earlier, securitisation markets globally were 
significantly affected by investors’ reassessment of 
risk, and accordingly, spreads on ABS increased by 
more than on other assets. Secondary market spreads 
on Australian RMBS also increased significantly – as 
distressed leveraged foreign investors liquidated 
their positions – to be well above the break-even 
spread at which it was economic to issue RMBS 
(Graph 3). 
Spreads on bank and corporate bonds also rose 
sharply. For example, secondary market domestic 
spreads to Commonwealth Government securities 
(CGS) on 3-year major banks’ unguaranteed bonds 
increased by around 170  basis points to peak at 
225 basis points at the height of the financial crisis. 
Spreads on BBB-rated corporate bonds continued 

























*S pread to CGS; guaranteed spread includes 70 basis point fee
** Spread to CGS
***S pread to bank bill swap rate




































Financials 304 532 40 57 18 21
Asset-backed 222 117 29 13 30 –20
  of which
  RMBS 176 95 23 10 33 –19
Corporates 136 157 18 17 14 5
Kangaroo(a) 103 124 13 13 41 6
total 765 929 100 100 21 7
(a)   A$ bonds issued domestically by non-residents
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As market conditions settled and investor risk 
aversion started to ease in 2009, spreads narrowed 
across all bond classes. Primary and secondary 
market spreads on RMBS have broadly converged, 
suggesting that the market has worked through 
most of the overhang of supply associated with 
sales by SIVs. Although spreads on issues in the 
primary market remain high by historical standards, 
recent issues, including those without the AOFM 
as a cornerstone investor, have been marginally 
profitable for the issuers. 
Spreads on the banks’ unguaranteed bonds   
narrowed over 2009 as investors’ appetite for credit 
returned, with spreads now around the same level 
as in late 2007. While corporate bond spreads 
have narrowed, they are yet to return to their late 
2007 levels.
Spreads across the spectrum of bonds have narrowed 
significantly since the height of the dislocation in 
markets, but they remain above the unusually low 
levels observed prior to the financial crisis.
Bond Maturity
Prior to the financial crisis, the most common 
maturity of Australian unsecured bonds at issuance 
was between four and six years, with an average 
maturity of close to six years.6 With the increase in 
risk aversion during the financial crisis, investors 
were more reluctant to commit their funds for long 
periods given the uncertain environment. As a result, 
the distribution of bond terms shifted toward shorter 
maturities, with nearly 30 per cent of bonds issued 
between July 2007 and end 2008 at maturities of one 
to two years compared with 8 per cent previously 
(Graph 4). The shortening of bond terms was driven 
by trends in banks’ bond issuance, which made up   
the bulk of bond issuance over the period, though   
this trend was also consistent across the corporate 
and Kangaroo sectors. More recently, the distribution 
of bond terms has lengthened as investor risk 
aversion has eased and banks have increasingly 
6  Bonds are classified as securities with a maturity of at least one year.
issued bonds at longer terms. Since 2009, only 
around 10 per cent of bonds were issued at terms of 
one to two years and around 55 per cent has been 
at terms of four years or more, up from 40 per cent at 
the height of the financial crisis. 
In contrast to unsecured bonds, the average 
outstanding term of Australian RMBS lengthened a 
little during the crisis, with some RMBS remaining 
outstanding longer than initially expected by 
investors. This was consistent with the global 
experience. Unlike most other bonds, RMBS do 
not have a ‘bullet’ maturity; rather than having a 
fixed maturity, they are repaid as the underlying 
mortgages are repaid, on average in around three 
to four years. RMBS are typically structured with an 
option for the issuer to redeem the RMBS before all 
of the underlying mortgages are repaid. This option 
– known as a ‘clean-up call’ – enables RMBS to be 
redeemed before the income from a declining pool 
of mortgages falls below the administrative costs 
of managing the RMBS, which  protects investors 
from being left with a small, illiquid stock of bonds. 
Historically, RMBS were called at the first available 
opportunity – with the small value of mortgages 
still outstanding repackaged into new RMBS – and 
were priced by investors based on this assumption. 
However, during the financial crisis, some issuers 
did not exercise their first available clean-up call. In 
Graph 4
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part this reflected a change to prudential standards 
in January 2008, whereby Australian authorised 
deposit-taking institutions were no longer permitted 
to call their RMBS when more than 10 per cent of   
the pool of mortgages remained outstanding.
Bond Covenants
Covenants are contractual restrictions designed to 
align borrowers’ actions with lenders’ interests. In 
the years leading up to the financial crisis, weaker 
covenants were included in some new bonds (and 
some bank loans). In contrast, following the increase 
in risk aversion associated with the financial crisis, 
investors have demanded stronger covenants. 
Recently issued corporate bonds have contained 
covenants such as negative pledges (to prevent the 
issuer from issuing debt that would rank higher than 
the bond) and change of control provisions (the 
investor has a ‘put option’ to sell the bond back to   
the issuer if there is a change of control at the 
company that could reduce credit quality, such as a 
leveraged buy-out). 
Credit Quality
Australia’s non-government bond market has 
historically been of high credit quality. Between 
2000 and mid 2007, over 40 per cent of issuance 
was rated AAA, with a further 36 per cent rated AA 
and the remainder almost entirely investment grade 
(at least BBB–, Graph  5).7 The high average credit 
quality reflected strong issuance of RMBS (most of 
which are rated AAA) and by the highly rated major 
banks (which account for the bulk of financials’ bond 
issuance and are rated AA), as well as corporates 
using credit wrapping (private guarantees) to boost 
their ratings to AAA.8 
Since mid 2007, issuance has continued to be 
concentrated among highly rated entities and, 
in fact, the distribution of issuance has shifted 
even more towards the highest-rated entities. This 
reflects increased investor preference for low-risk 
financial assets, particularly AAA-rated securities 
(with the exception of structured credit products). 
The high credit quality has also been underpinned 
by the sound balance sheets of Australian financial 
institutions and the corporate sector, the resilience 
of the domestic economy, and the introduction of 
the Government guarantee on wholesale funding. 
The average share of issuance since mid 2007 that 
was AAA-rated is 50 per cent, 7 percentage points 
higher than prior to the crisis, and the share rated 
AA has also increased a little. This largely owed to 
strong guaranteed and unguaranteed issuance by 
the major banks more than offsetting the lack of 
RMBS issuance.
Consistent with trends in issuance, the credit 
quality of the stock of Australian bonds outstanding 
increased in recent years (Graph  6). This largely 
reflected changes in issuance patterns as there have 
7  The limited sub-investment grade issuance by Australian issuers has 
been almost entirely into offshore markets (mostly the US market). 
While the lack of a sub-investment grade market in Australia 
contributes to the high credit quality of the domestic market, it 
means that lower-rated companies rely on bank loans or offshore 
capital markets for debt funding. 
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been limited rating changes for Australian bonds. 
This is in contrast to the international experience of 
relatively widespread downgrades. Australian bond 
issuers continue to be highly rated compared with 
the global average, with 85 per cent of Australian 
issuers rated investment grade compared with 
60 per cent of global issuers.9
Whereas globally there were significant downgrades 
to structured credit instruments, the credit quality of 
Australian ABS outstanding has remained very high, 
with almost all AAA-rated RMBS tranches having 
retained their rating. This reflects the quality of loans 
securitised, which have been underpinned by the 
strength of the domestic economy. While there have 
been negligible rating downgrades, the ongoing 
amortisation of principal, combined with limited 
issuance, has nonetheless caused the outstanding 
value of AAA-rated RMBS to fall sharply. 
Also in contrast to their global counterparts, there 
were only limited downgrades to the credit ratings 
of the Australian-owned banks during the financial 
crisis – the major banks all retained their AA rating and 
continue to be among the most highly rated banks 
globally.10 In the initial stages of the financial crisis, 
strong bond issuance by the major banks pushed 
up the stock outstanding of AA-rated bonds. Then 
as the crisis intensified, the Australian banks issued a 
large volume of Government-guaranteed AAA-rated 
bonds in response to an increase in investor risk 
aversion globally. As market conditions settled over 
2009 and investor appetite for credit risk increased, 
the banks reduced their use of the guarantee and 
issued an increasing volume of unguaranteed 
(AA-rated) bonds. AAA-rated guaranteed bonds 
currently make up about one-third of the stock of 
financial bonds outstanding. 
9  Of entities rated globally by S&P, 18  per  cent were downgraded 
in 2009; in contrast, 4  per  cent of rated Australian entities were 
downgraded.
10  While the outstanding bonds of some foreign subsidiaries operating 
in Australia were downgraded due to downgrades of their parents, 
this effect on the credit quality of financials’ bonds outstanding 
was more than offset by the increased issuance of major banks’ 
guaranteed and unguaranteed bonds.
Almost all Australian corporate bonds are 
investment grade and most maintained their rating 
during the financial crisis. Credit-wrapped bonds, 
which account for around 10 per cent of corporate 
bonds, were an exception to this. Credit wrapping 
is a type of credit enhancement whereby a bond 
insurer guarantees to meet interest and principal 
payments as they fall due if the issuer defaults. At 
issuance, almost all credit-wrapped bonds had a 
AAA rating by virtue of the bond insurers’ ratings. 
However, many bond insurers have suffered multiple 
downgrades since the beginning of 2008 and most 
now have ratings lower than the underlying ratings 
of the issuers, with several rated below investment 
grade. While 80  per  cent of these credit-wrapped 
bonds have been downgraded, they are still all rated 
investment grade, reflecting the solid stand-alone 
ratings of Australian corporates – $5 billion are still 
rated AAA, $5 billion have been downgraded to A 
and $15 billion have been downgraded to BBB.
Whereas prior to the crisis, Kangaroo issuance was 
split evenly between AAA and AA-rated bonds, 
issuance has been almost entirely by AAA-rated 
entities since mid 2007. This partly reflects investors’ 
greater risk aversion towards lower-rated securities 62 ReseRve BAnk of AustRAliA
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and appetite for highly rated bonds. The resultant 
pick-up in credit quality has been partly offset 
by credit rating downgrades to the outstanding 
bonds of some foreign financial institutions during 
the crisis.
Defaults
The resilience of the Australian bond market 
throughout the financial crisis is also evident in 
the limited default experience, compared with 
the significant spike in defaults in global bond 
markets. No publicly rated financial or corporate 
bond issued by an Australian entity has defaulted 
during the financial crisis; the most recent publicly 
rated bond default by an Australian entity was 
2003. In comparison – and reflective of the global 
bond market – the first bond defaults by Kangaroo 
issuers occurred in 2008 (Lehman Brothers and two 
Icelandic banks). Nonetheless, these make up only 
a small share of the Kangaroo market, accounting 
for around 1 per cent of the stock outstanding (and 
0.1 per cent of the Australian bond market).
Unlike international RMBS, no losses have been 
borne by an investor in a rated tranche of an 
Australian RMBS. There have been a few small value 
defaults of other ABS, though in total these make 
up just 0.2 per cent of the Australian ABS market.  
Conclusion
The Australian bond market was resilient during 
the financial crisis. Credit quality remained high 
and in contrast to the global experience, there 
have been only limited rating downgrades or 
defaults in the Australian market in recent years. 
The decrease in investor appetite for risk and 
changes in issuer behaviour did, however, result in 
slower overall issuance, an increase in the quality 
of new issuance, shorter bond terms, tighter bond 
covenants and spreads reaching historical highs. As 
market conditions have improved, bond terms have 
lengthened, and spreads have narrowed, although 
spreads are higher than the unusually low levels 
observed in the lead-up to the financial crisis.  
References
Black S, A Brassil and M Hack (2010), ‘Recent Trends 
in Australian Banks’ Bond Issuance’, RBA Bulletin,  March,   
pp 27–34.
Black S, J Kirkwood and S Shah Idil (2009), ’Australian 
Corporates’ Sources and Uses of Funds’, RBA Bulletin, 
October, pp 1–12.
Debelle G (2008), ’A Comparison of the US and Australian 
Housing Markets’, Address to the Sub-Prime Mortgage 
Meltdown Symposium, Adelaide, 16 May.
RBA (Reserve Bank of Australia) (2007a), Financial Stability 
Review, September.
RBA (2007b), Statement on Monetary Policy, November. 
RBA (2008), ‘Box B: The Domestic Credit-Wrapped Bond 
Market’, Statement on Monetary Policy, August, pp 50–51.
Ryan C (2007), ‘Some General Observations on the 
Kangaroo Bond Market’, RBA Bulletin, April, pp 10–17.
Schwartz C (2010), ‘The Australian Government Guarantee 
Scheme’, RBA Bulletin, March, pp 19–26.